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ABSTRACT
The Electoral College system for selection of the
chief executive of the United States has been described as
undemocratic, archaic, complex, ambiguous, indirect, and 
dangerous, by the American Bar Association. Other noted
scholars, politicians and political scientists have made 
numerous attempts to amend the Constitution to any number 
of revision plans, notably the proportional plan, the 
district plan, and currently, the direct vote plan. In
addition to all the dozens of reform movements introduced
in Congress each year, numerous commissions, private 
studies, and institutes have issued a prodigious amount of 
reports. In 1969 a constitutional' amendment to abolish the
Electoral College came within a few votes of passing
Congress.
This thesis briefly reviews the content of Article
II, section 1 of the Constitution which established the 
Electoral College (modified by Amendment XII), and the 
principal reform plans that have developed over the years. 
A serious examination of these reform efforts is examined,
together with their possible effects on the entire
political system.
The Electoral College acts as leverage in a 
presidential election, by enhancing the status of minority
iii
II
groups. iChanging to a direct plan would damage minority 
interests since a national popular majority would 
overwhelm their votes, The Electoral College contributes 
to the political stability of the nation by encouraging 
,the two-party system, while the direct vote system would 
destroy it. A direct popular election would result in an 
unstable, political system characterized by a multitude of
I
parties,; with more radical changes from one administration 
to the next. The recent election for president in France, 
which has a direct election system for president bears
i
witness to this.
The1 Electoral College maintains the federal 
democratic system, and is a paradigm for the whole system 
of government. To abolish the Electoral .College in favor a 
direct pdpular election for president would strike at the 
very heart of the federal structure established by the
I
founding; fathers, and lead to the nationalization of the
I
central government, to the detriment of the states.
i
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ON TRIAL
The 2000 Election
The last lever has been pulled. The last card has
been punched. The curtains have been drawn across the
voting booths. The cards have been packed in boxes to be 
sent to1 the electoral officials at each state capital to 
be tabulated. Therein begins a procedure, the Electoral
College system, to determine who shall become the next
President of the United States.
What should have been .a straightforward procedure was 
turned into a hotly contested race for the presidency 
between Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush 
of Texas. As early as October, the daily tracking showed 
it to be a distinctly close race. The Gallup Poll charted 
nine lead changes during the fall campaign. As election
night wore on, claims and counter claims were made for one 
winner or another. By 10:06 p.m. Dan Rather commented on 
CBS news that it was beginning to look like the advantage 
was going to George W. Bush. As votes filtered in from
other istates, the lead shifted from one to the other
candidate, until the drama of Florida unfolded. At one
I
time,.Vice President Gore called Governor Bush with a
1
congratulatory message, but as Bush's lead dwindled, he 
sent another message with a disclaimer. On the morning
after the election, the contest in Florida showed Bush
leading Gore by only 926 votes, prompting an automatic 
recount. Counts, recounts, and appeals to the courts 
continued for five weeks, until finally the Supreme Court 
ruled that the recounts be stopped, giving the victory to 
George W. Bush. Thus ended the most disputed election 
since 1867, when Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel J.
Tilden.
After eighteen months of campaigning, and 
expenditures of more than a billion dollars, it seemed
that Gore was the popular vote winner with a 222,880 vote 
lead. As of November 20th, Gore had amassed 49,252,780 
popular votes, Bush, 49,036,35 (Caeser & Busch, 2001) . The 
predictions of the Electoral College reformers had come 
true; for the first time since 1888 the popular vote 
winner had lost the presidency.
While the year 2000 election controversy was not the 
complete disaster for the Electoral College system that 
its opponents had predicted, it provoked the same
questions that have plagued political scientists and 
politicians since the Constitution of 1787 was adopted.
2
The Electoral College, a general-ticket, 
winner-take-all system, has been repeatedly attacked, 
almost from the day it was adopted, by politicians 
demanding a democratic one-man, one-vote plan for choosing 
the president. The general-ticket, winner-take-all system 
for selection of the president was not constitutionally
mandated, but arose later with the growth of political
parties. Under this system, the state delivers all of its
electoral votes to the popular winner, giving it
significant influence on the final outcome of an election. 
To quote Thomas Jefferson, "If ten choose....by the 
general ticket, it is worse than folly for the other six 
not to do it" (Hardaway, 1994, p. 90). In the 
winner-take-all plan, a plurality magnifies the winner's 
majority of victory in the electoral vote. It rewards a
candidate who creates a broad, inclusive national
coalition, and eliminates candidates who do not.
Is the present election system undemocratic, or does 
it remain the best system for choosing the chief executive 
of the;'world's most prestigious nation? Should the 
Electoral College system be revised to more accurately 
portray the democratic mood of today's citizens?
9
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Democracy Versus Republicanism 
The term democracy is derived from the Greek word
"demokratia", demos meaning people, and kratia meaning 
rule. It is a form of government in which citizens rule
the state. The essential features of democracy are that
citizens are free in speech and assembly, free to form 
competing parties, and that voters are able to choose 
among the candidates of those parties in regularly held 
elections. Democracy is a government by the many, instead 
of by the few. It is based on the belief that all should 
have the same basic rights and freedoms, and that people 
should be free to govern themselves. Rights and 
responsibilities are not unlimited, however. Some 
restrictions are necessary. People may not infringe on the 
rights of others, confiscate their property or injure
them.
Citizens of a democracy have freedom of speech and 
the press - this is essential to the survival of
democracy. Freedom of speech includes freedom of
expression in all forms of communication including
television, radio, films, theater, dance, music,
literature and painting. The right of free speech, press 
and thought includes the'right to publish and read 
newspapers, magazines, and books, as long as there is no
4
libel of others. It includes the right to differ, and to 
express opinions even though they may be contrary to the
opinions of others.
Democracy confers upon its citizens the freedom of 
assembly. They may meet to support, criticize, to debate 
governmental policies, to pass resolutions or send 
petitions to their elected officials.
At the heart of democracy is the supremacy of the
people, not its governmental officials. Voters have 
popular sovereignty - they may keep their officials in
office or remove them by voting them out. Under a
democracy people have political freedom, full civil 
rights, independence of movement, religious freedom, free
economic opportunity, and equal educational opportunities 
without regard to race, creed, color, or social position. 
Democracy is a system of government in which the power to 
make important political decisions rests with the 
community; a government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people. Direct democracy refers to a system of 
government whose citizens decide issues by their votes.
With all the above benefits, why was it that the 
Founding Fathers in 1787 feared democracy, and elected to 
choose' a republican form of government?
5
Alexander Hamilton, referring to the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 said, "We are now forming a republican 
form of government. Real liberty is not found in the
extremes of democracy, but in moderate government. If we 
incline too much to democracy, we shall soon shoot into a 
monarchy, or some other form of dictator" (Williams,
2002).
James Madison wrote, "democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with security or the rights of 
property; and have in general been as short in their lives 
as they have been violent on their deaths" (Publius, no. 
10, 1996, p. 49).
Madison's (1961) answer to the dangers of a direct 
democracy was a representative democracy, a system of 
government in which the sovereign holds authority granted 
by the people, and ruled according to law. Power is 
derived from the people through the process of the vote, 
and government then operates within, and under the control
of law (In the United States, the Constitution). The
Founding Fathers created the Constitution according to 
this concept (Publius, no. 10, 1961.)
The Constitution is the grant of authority for the 
government; it is the law of the people for the control of
6
the government. Madison (1961) interprets a republic as a 
government in which a scheme of representation takes
place, or a delegation of the government to a smaller
number of citizens elected by the rest. "The effect," 
Madison (1961) writes, "is to refine and enlarge the 
public views by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and
love of justice will beat least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations.... In the extent and
proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a 
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to a 
republican government" (p. 50, 52) .
The democratic republican form of government as we
know it in the United States, utilizes the democratic
principle, but limits it by the rule of law, the
Constitution. The people vote for representatives who then 
choose those who will govern, and vote on appropriate laws 
and measures. The House of Representatives is the most 
democratic, being directly chosen by the voters. The 
Senate has two members who represent all the voters in his 
state, a republican concept. The executive is chosen by 
electors, two from each state, the winner then receiving
7
all the votes of that state, a decidedly republican
concept.
The most important difference between a democratic 
and a republican form of government is the subordination 
of the power of the majority to the rule of law. There 
must be rules of law to prevent the majority from imposing
their will on the minority through the election process. 
The Constitution not only diffuses the powers of 
government within the federal government, but also divides
the powers of government between two independent and 
sovereign entities, the federal and the fifty states.
The democratic republican form of government
establishes a system of checks and balances, a separation 
of powers, and may not be changed by the majority, but 
only by an amendment process requiring extraordinary 
majorities to propose and ratify. In addition, these 
requirements can not be exercised directly by the people, 
but only by their elected representatives. By establishing 
these safeguards against the absolute rule of a majority, 
the Founding Fathers created not a democracy, but a 
republic in which the people have a voice, yet 
circumscribed by fixed laws, i.e. the Constitution. The 
Electoral College was established by these republican
8
principles, and remains a viable system even in the 
twenty-first century.
The Electoral College - A Novel System 
The members of the Federal Convention meeting in the
summer of 1787 met with no problem as difficult as that of
choosing the method for selecting the chief executive of
the United States. James Wilson, a representative,
speaking on the floor of the Convention, said that the 
subject had "greatly divided the House....It is in truth
the most difficult of all on which we have to decide"
(Publius, 1961, p. 3).
Senator Plumer of Massachusetts felt that the
Electoral College system was decided upon because it was 
the least exceptionable than any of the others proposed. 
But Abraham Pickering, a member of the formulating 
committee, said that, "late in their session the present 
complex mode of electing the president was proposed, that 
the mode was perfectly novel, and viewed as the most
pleasing feature of the Constitution" (Publius, 1961,
p. 4) .
The framers of the Constitution were striving in 1787 
to devise a government that would allow the states to
retain certain local powers, but to agree to surrender
9
some of the powers necessary to establish the sovereignty 
of a nation. It was necessary to create an almost perfect 
balance between retained and delegated powers in order to. 
form the framework of federalism necessary for democracy 
to flourish. They were familiar with the history of large 
countries with strong central control, as well as those 
without enough central power, soon torn by internal
rivalries. The true genius of the American Constitution 
was a system of federalism within which democracy could 
survive and thrive. Any notion that a sovereign nation 
could be founded without taking cognizance of states was 
unthinkable. The states were sovereign functioning 
governments, each with its own culture and history. 
Agreement, compromise, and consensus with the states was 
an absolute necessity if the Constitution was to come into 
existence (Publius, 1961). The federal democratic system 
which emerged was the result of such accommodation and
consensus.
How the executive was to be chosen was a much
disputed matter. Wilson was for a direct election by the 
people. George Mason was fearful of leaving the choice 
directly to the people. John Rutledge favored the
selection being made by the second branch of the
legislature. Later, Wilson offered the first proposal of
10
an electoral college; he proposed that states be divided 
into districts, with qualified voters of the national 
legislature electing from their respective districts the 
person who would be the chief executive. This plan was at 
first rejected, but a consensus later developed in favor
of electors making the actual selection. The issue was 
reconsidered, scrapped, and eventually given to the
Committee on Detail, who could come to no agreement. The
issue was then sent to the Committee on Unfinished
Portions, argued, disputed clause by clause, and finally
agreed upon, and sent to the Committee on Style and
Arrangement for final refinement. On September 17th, 1787,
the Constitution, including the Electoral College system
for selection of the president, was finally adopted by
unanimous consent of all the states present.
The mode of appointment of the chief magistrate 
of the United States is almost the only part of 
the system, of any consequence, which has 
escaped without severe censure, or which has 
received the slightest mark of approbation from 
its opponents. The most plausible of these, who 
has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit 
that the election of the president is pretty 
well guarded. I venture to say somewhat further 
and hesitate not to affirm, that in the manner 
of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent.
! It unites in an eminent degree all the
advantages the union was to be wished for.
1 (Publius, no. 10, 1961, p. 23)
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Madison (1961) interprets a republic as a government 
in which a scheme of representation takes place, or the
delegation of the government to a smaller number of
citizens elected by the rest. "The effect," MadisonI
writes, "is to refine and enlarge the public views by 
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of 
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest 
of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice 
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations.... In the extent and proper 
structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican 
remedy for the diseases most incident to a republican 
government" (1961, p. 50).
There have been, in its 200-year history, a number of 
critics who have proposed reforms to the Electoral College 
system, most of them trying to eliminate it. But there are
also staunch defenders of the Electoral College who, 
although perhaps less vocal than its critics, offer very 
powerful arguments for it.
12
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL
COLLEGE SYSTEM
The Electoral College system was established in
Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, and modified
I
chiefly by the 12th Amendment. Each state is allocated a 
number of electors equal to two senators, and the number 
of representatives allowed for each state. This number for 
each state may change according to the state's population
as determined by the census. The political parties in each
state submit to the state's election official a list of
individuals pledged to their candidate for president and
equal to the state's electoral vote. States have absolute 
authority over the method for selection of electors. These 
individuals are usually chosen in state party conventions, 
or through appointment by state party leaders, while third 
parties and independent candidates merely designate 
theirs. Members or employees of the federal government are 
prohibited from serving as electors. After caucuses and 
primaries, the major parties nominate their candidates for 
president and vice president in national conventions. The
names of those nominated are then submitted to each
state's chief election official so that they may appear on
13
the general election ballot. On the Tuesday following the 
first Monday in November, the people vote by ballot for 
the party slate of electors representing their choice for 
president and vice president. The presidential ticket 
winning the most popular votes in the state, (except for
Maine and Nebraska, who have two. votes for the entire
state, the rest for each congressional district vote), is
awarded all the state's electoral votes.
On Monday following the second Wednesday of December, 
each state's electors meet in their respective capitals to 
cast their electoral votes; one for president and one for 
vice president. In order to prevent favoritism, at least
one of their votes must be for a candidate from a state
other than their own. The electoral votes are then sealed
and transmitted to the President of the Senate, who opens 
them on January 6th and reads them before both houses of 
Congress. The candidate with a majority of electoral votes
is then declared President of the United States. In the
event that no one wins an absolute majority of electoral
votes for president, the House of Representatives selects 
the president from the three topmost candidates receiving 
electoral votes, with each state casting one vote, and an 
absolute majority being necessary to elect. If no one 
receives an absolute majority for vice president, the
14
Senate selects from the two topmost candidates for that 
office. On January 20th the duly elected President and 
Vice President are sworn into office (Publius, 1961).
Controversies surrounding the Electoral College are
as old as the Constitution itself. More amendments have
been offered on this subject than any other section of the 
Constitution. Lawrence D. Longley describes the Electoral 
College system as:
A deplorable political institution.... if the 
Electoral College were only a neutral and sure 
means for counting votes, and aggregating votes, 
it would be the subject of little controversy. 
The Electoral College, however, is neither 
certain in its operation nor neutral in its 
effects....In short, the Electoral College is a 
flawed means of determining the President. Its 
workings at best are neither smooth nor fair, 
and at its worst contain the potential for 
constitutional crisis....It must be abolished. 
(Yunker & Longley, 1976, p. 193)
The American Bar Association has Called the Electoral
College system archaic, undemocratic, unambiguous,
indirect, and dangerous (Gossett, 1967). Critics find most 
troubling the unit-vote, or general-ticket system for 
choosing the president and vice president, the faithless 
elector, and the contingency election in the House of 
Representatives, in the event no majority is achieved on
the first ballot.
15
The Proportional Plan 
In 1906, J. Hampden Dougherty published a
comprehensive account of specific reform measures to avoid 
these perils, and a proposed remedy by amendment to the 
Constitution. His suggested remedy, the proportional plan, 
provides that the vote in every state would be as it is 
now in electing the governor. Each person's vote would
count equally in the electoral result in the state in the
ratio to the total number of votes. State authorities
would have the duty to count all the votes for president 
and vice president, and to apportion the presidential 
electoral votes in the same ratio between the popular vote
and the total vote for all the candidates. Each state
would have the same number of votes in the election of the
president as in the whole number of senators and
representatives to which they have in Congress. The person 
having the highest number of electoral votes, including 
decimals, in all the states would be declared president, 
the vice president to be chosen in the same way. In the 
event of a tie, the candidate having the largest number in
the aggregate of all qualified voters in all states shall 
be awarded the presidency (Dougherty, 1906) . Dougherty
believes that his resolution is an answer to the several
defects in the present Electoral College system. It allows
16
each person an equal vote in the presidential election. It 
settles all controversy in case of a tie without assigning 
the decision to the House of Representatives. It solves 
the difficulties encountered in the present mode (or lack
thereof) in counting the electoral votes. The state
continues to be an important part of the electoral
process, as intended by the framers of the Constitution. 
State officials would settle any problems arising in the 
electoral count. No amendment thus far has entirely 
eliminated the probability for election of a minority
president, but proportional plan lessens the possibility 
(Dougherty, 1906).
Best thinks that the proportional plan could produce
fundamental changes in political alignments. Allan Sindler 
believes that the proportional plan would lead to
one-party domination in elections, and an increase in the
South's political influence (Best, 1975). Lucius
Wilmerding, Jr. concedes that the proportional system is a 
reasonably accurate device for taking the sense of the 
people and much superior for that purpose than the 
general-ticket system, but has doubts on other grounds 
(Wilmerding, 1958, p. 332).
First, disputed elections would become more frequent,I
possibly extending to every state, delaying prompt
17
selection of the chief executive. Second, the possibility 
exists that the House of Representatives would be of a 
different party than the president. The chief objection is 
that equal ideological masses of people, rather than 
geographical masses are entitled to equal votes, and this
principle should not become a part of governmental
institutions (Wilmerding, 1958).
The District Plan
In 1832 James Madison wrote to John Jay that the
single-member district plan was the plan of choice when 
the Constitution was framed and adopted. In 1834 he 
emphasized that it would be a great improvement if 
electoral districtand eventual decision by joint ballot of
both Houses could be established (Publius, 1961).
The district plan divides each state into districts 
equal to the number of representatives that each state is 
entitled to in Congress. Districts shall be contiguous and 
compact, containing approximately the same number of 
persons each state is entitled to in Congress, and may not
be altered until after the next census. Inhabitants of
districts qualifying for electors to the House of
Representatives shall choose two electors each for
president and vice president, none holding an office of
18
profit or trust under the United States government. 
Electors meet in their respective states and vote for 
president and vice president. Lists of all persons voted
for shall be certified, sealed, and transmitted to the
President of the Senate, who shall open them and count the
votes. The candidate with the most votes shall be declared
the winner. If no candidate has the required forty
percent’, then the combined Senate and the House with a
majority of members present and voting makes the
selection. Votes are to be taken by states, not by
individual voters.
Proponents of the district system argue that the 
sentiments of the people would be taken by districts, 
instead of by states, thereby more accurately representing 
the will of the people; the president would then be the 
choice of the people. They disagree with the
general-ticket system that permits the minority to be 
counted for the majority, possibly resulting in the defeat 
of the popular choice. An important difference in the two 
plans is that the district plan gives the presidential 
election a national character, while the present
general-ticket plan gives it a federal one.
Opponents to the district plan cite the distribution 
of state votes among several candidates as possibly
19
reversing the order of the leaders. A candidate could
receive a majority of district votes, but lose the state
votes unless he could win over half of them. It is also
argued that the district system is inevitably subject to 
gerrymandering; it cannot and will not be operated fairly.
A congressman in 1816, commenting on the district
system said:
I had, Mr. Chairman the honor of a seat in the 
legislature of New York, when that state last 
divided into districts for the purpose of 
electing members of this House. How were they 
laid off? With the sole view of returning as 
many as possible to this House.... counties were 
cut and slashed in every direction; districts, 
singles, double, and treble, of every shape and 
of every size, were manufactured....In short, no 
device, however shameful, was omitted to obtain 
the result, and the result was obtained.
' (Wilmerding, 1958, p. 151, 152)
The district plan would encourage the formation of
minority parties, thus destroying the two-party system, 
which has proved to be effective in all but a few isolated 
cases of deciding presidential elections in a clear-cut 
and prompt manner. A minority party would fight to win 
seats in the House of Representatives hoping that the 
election would devolve on that body. There is considerable 
doubt/ however, about the prospects of a district plan 
amendment being approved by Congress. The larger states 
would never relinquish the power they now hold under the
20
general-ticket plan. Neither would the smaller states 
abandon their power to elect their candidate by the equal 
vote they now hold in the House of Representatives 
(Wilmerding, 1958).
Serious objections have been raised to both the 
district plan and the proportional plan; either would 
weaken the presidency, localize presidential elections, 
compromise the two-party system, and give advantages to 
the smaller states. By the late 1960's, demands for a
direct popular vote took center stage. Polls indicated
between seventy-eight and eighty-one percent of the
electorate favored the more democratic one-person one-vote 
system (Best, 1975).
Direct Popular Vote Plan
The direct popular vote plan has the approval of a 
significant number of politicians and citizens, who cite 
it as being as being sensible, democratic, and straight­
forward. It allows the people, each having an equal vote 
to choose his preference for the chief executive of the 
United States. Its proponents believe the direct popular 
vote system provides the most direct and democratic way 
for selecting the president. In this plan, the people of
the several states and the District of Columbia shall cast
21
a single vote for the two persons who have joined their 
names as candidates for the office of president and vice 
president. The joint-team candidates for president and 
vice president having the greatest number of votes, 
providing such numbers are at least forty percent of votes
cast, are declared the winners. If none of the candidates
receive more than forty percent, a runoff election would
be held between the two highest on the list. State
legislatures shall determine the times, places, and manner
of holding such elections. Congress could at any time make 
or alter such regulations, and would have the power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation (Gossett,
1958).
The case for direct election has a strong foundation. 
Proponents claim that it is the only reform system 
propos'ed thus far that remedies all the defects specified 
in the current general-ticket system. Plus, it is the only 
reform that has a chance of being adopted in Congress, 
judging by the close votes that have occurred in past 
attempts. In 1969, the House passed a direct election
amendment by more than the two-thirds majority, and was 
supported by a majority, although not by the necessary 
two-thirds of the Senate (Best, 1975). Supporters of 
direct election point out that this plan solves the
22
"faithless elector" problem, in that electors are
completely eliminated from the amendment. Because they are 
not now constrained by the Constitution, they could 
possibly play the role of spoiler, influencing the outcome
of an election.
Supporters of direct election claim that this 
amendment will reduce propensity for fraud, because it 
will reduce the potential for reward. They argue that less
leverage means less fraud, and that the direct election
system has the less leverage of all.
Direct election prevents a contingency election in 
the House of Representatives, a practice long condemned 
and feared by many. George McDuffie said in 1826, "there
cannot be a greater solecism than that which is involved 
in the idea of commencing the election of the president 
upon one principle, and ending it according to
another....Nothing can be more absurd than to abandon it 
entirely as soon as the people at the first effort, fail 
to give a majority of vote to one candidate" (Wilmerding, 
1958, p. 185). Thomas Jefferson told his friend George Hay
that he had "ever considered the Constitutional mode of
election ultimately by the legislature voting by states as 
the most dangerous blot in our Constitution, and one which 
some unlucky chance will someday hit, and give us a pope
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and an anti-pope" (Publius, 1961, p. 3). Direct plan 
advocates suggest that the simplest remedy to this problem 
is the instant runoff election whereby the voter selects
his first and second choices on the first ballot. The
candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated,
then the second choices on those ballots are counted until
a winner is obtained.
Finally, advocates assert, the direct-vote system 
provides for preservation of federalism, in that it 
allocates to state legislatures the time, places, and 
manner of holding presidential elections, and entitlement
on the ballot (Best, 1975).
Charges against the direct popular vote plan are
wide-ranging. Alan Sindler cites the insurmountable
problem of gerrymandering (Best, 1975) . Best alludes to 
the dangers of fraud under the direct system, because it
would increase the number of close elections. Under the
contingency provisions, there is a possibility of fraud, 
both in the general election and the runoff (Bickel,
1971). It is possible that the direct-vote plan could 
invite non-regional interests that have hopes of amassing 
enough votes to be a bargaining influence in a runoff.
With votes aggregated nationwide, numerous contenders 
would force a runoff with regularity. The majority party
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would count for much less than it does now. Party unity 
would cease to exist; everything would be a preparation 
for later coalitions. More open, multi-party politics, 
praised by direct-vote adherents, would also offer 
opportunities for pressures on one or another causes or 
prejudices. The present system allows for coalitions to be 
formed in two-party conventions, but under a direct 
system, coalitions would be relegated to a few candidates 
and their managers, between the election and the runoff. 
They would become weaker, with less ability to arrive at
well-founded decisions. There would be less access to the
election process. A direct election would have a profound 
effect on the kinds of men who would become president. If 
the national party convention system is superceded by a 
national primary, as is foreseen by the direct system, 
then party leaders could lose control over the nomination 
process. Demagogues, self-nominated, individualistic
leaders of prejudicial factions, charismatic leaders 
beleaguering a single issue, might replace the candidate 
presently conscripted because of their moderate
experience, records of electoral success, and service to 
permanent party organizations. In short, the prospects are 
that the direct election plan would increase the incidence 
of party-splits, and encourage the development of minor
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parties. It would, undermine party control over the crucial 
task of nomination, and postpone compromise. It would 
increase the importance of homogeneous regions and 
one-party states, and disturb the geographic distribution
of party support. It would reduce the influence of state
party leaders, and encourage the formation of doctrinaire 
and single-issue parties, simplifying and dramatizing 
issues (Best, 1975).
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CHAPTER THREE
IN DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE
Best has developed a set of standards by which to 
judge the merits of an electoral process. First, it should 
fill the office; it should produce a swift, sure, clean,
and clear decision. It should produce a president who can 
govern because of sufficient popular support, and who is 
independent, thereby supporting the separation of powers.
It should reduce the premium on fraud, and produce
moderate winners who are tolerable to losers. Last, but
not least, it should preserve the federal system. The 
present Electoral College system comes very close.to 
fulfilling all these requirements.
The president fills an unparalleled role in the
government of the United States. He is the Head of State,
the Commander-in-Chief of the nation's defense forces, the
only person who can speak for the entire nation, and, in
recent times, he has become the leader of the free world.
In the selection of a leader to fill these important 
positions, it becomes evident that the election process 
"should produce a swift, sure, clean, and clear decision" 
(Best; 1975). An election in doubt would prolong the
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process, giving the incoming Head of State little time to
organize the new government. Numerous recounts, or 
elections tied up in courts increases the possibility of 
fraud, crippling the effectiveness of the office. Any 
uncertainty would invite intrigue, not only at home, but
also among foreign enemies. An election in doubt would
prolong the process, giving the incoming Head of State
little time to organize the new government. This not to 
say that the present system is devoid of the possibility
of fraud, but it provides for the best practical defense
against it.
The president must not be chosen by Congress, except 
as a last resort, because of the strong likelihood that 
Congress would control the executive branch of government 
The possibility of conspiracies between the two branches 
would be a decided detriment to the people. The president 
should command at least a plurality, or better still, a
majority of the voters, in order to have a mandate to
govern. This becomes all the more important when one 
considers the complex structure of the nation - the
diverse population, ethnic groups, religions, races, and 
economic status. Support for the president must be broad 
and deep, widely distributed across the nation. The 
present selection procedure is one that can structure and
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shape the majority, forcing the candidates to build a
broad cross-sectional base.
In Defense of Federalism
Federalism is a very important element in the 
election process. "The proper name for the form of 
government established by the constitution is a 
democratic-federal republic" (Best, 1996, p. 39), It
maintains the balance of power between the president and 
Congress, between national and regional interests. Methods
of selection for both institutions should be the same; if 
Congress has a federal base, so should the presidency. If 
the president were chosen from the electorate at large,
that office would claim a more authentic mandate than that
of Congress, affording it more power and prestige than 
that of Congress, and at the expense of local interests.
John F. Kennedy, in his now famous quote, says, "It 
is not only the unit vote for the presidency we are 
talking about, but a whole solar system of governmental 
power. If it is proposed to change the balance of power of 
one of the elements of the solar system, it is necessary 
to consider the others" (Hardaway, 1994, p. 1).
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of
1787had created this "solar system," a federal-democratic
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form of government, through a process of compromise and 
accommodation. They were constrained by the era in which 
they lived, by the sentiments of a variety of peoples, 
each with their own persuasions and desires. They were a 
people recently freed from the yoke of the British, and 
carrying with them an intolerance of any person or group 
who would infringe upon their new-found freedoms. The 
framers were realists, not idealists, who saw the very 
real necessity of forging from this hodge-podge of peoples 
and ideas, a framework of government, if not a perfect
system, at least, one that had the fewest imperfections; a
government that could satisfy the majority without totally 
alienating the minority.
The Constitution itself was adopted under the federal 
principle of state equality. The people in each of the 
thirteen states were to determine for themselves to adopt 
or reject the Constitution as presented by the Convention. 
The state equality principle treats all states with equal 
respect and fairness; the federal districting system 
divides the nation into smaller districts, and requires
that votes be cast for national officers in states or
parts of states. The whole is composed of distinct parts; 
votes may not be combined across state lines; the majority 
of states could not decide for the minority.
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Today, as then, the common rights of people in states 
are recognized. The state equality principle is recognized
in the Senate with two elected officers from each state,
no matter what the population size. The same principle is 
recognized ratifying amendments to the Constitution, where 
states are granted only one vote, regardless of size. The
federal principle is the base on which all three branches 
of government are founded. The federal principle limits 
the will of the majority, since it places barriers around 
votes, adding a distribution requirement to that of a 
simple majority.
In a large nation with diverse populations, there
must be a balance between national and local interests.
Local governments with local problems, a part of a larger 
society, could not be protected by a simple majority 
representation of one-man, one-vote. An unstructured 
majority will tend to overlook local interests. Creating a 
government on the federal principle, one made up of 
representatives who speak for the interests of people in 
separate states, means that the government will be 
sensitive to local needs and rights. Applying these 
principles to the office of president is important in 
keeping a response to state viewpoints. A candidate cannot 
win a simple majority of the popular votes, he must win
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states.,He must seek consensus by building a broad
coalition of local interests.
The inclusion of the federal principle is essential
to create political majorities, which are open to all 
voters. Compromise is essential in a large heterogeneous 
society, such as the United States. States must compromise
at the state level with the many and varied interests to
form state and local majorities. The federal principle 
reminds people that they live together in community, that 
they have civic interests that transcend private
interests. They must compromise ,to elect representatives
I
to the national government. The national interest is 
defined by the representatives of public minorities. To
use the federal districting system rather than a one-man,
one-vote plan means that the results will come closer to 
the common good.
An important concept of the federal principle is that 
it protects the separation of powers. "Without the federal 
principle, the separation of powers will fail" (Best,
1975,'p. 39). One-man, one-vote is not enough to keep the 
representatives faithful to the majority or plurality of 
the people. If everyone had the same interests, or if
government decisions affected all alike, there would be no
problem, but what is a benefit to some is a burden to
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others. To avoid conflict or revolution, the burdens must
be reasonable. Since representatives are responsible to 
those who elect them, they may be faithful to "an unjust 
master,- to a majority who would act like a band of 
robbers" (Best, 1975, p. 40). In a proper federal system, 
one party will not control the whole government, since 
members of government do not owe allegiance to a national
party, but rather to local and state parties, which will 
tend to protect minorities from majorities.
Although one party may nominally control the
government, the separation of powers will still work. The 
controlling party must compromise with the minority party, 
even within his own party, to achieve success in getting 
his programs passed.
The will of the majority to be rightful must be 
reasonable. Reasonable majorities are created by 
a process of opposite and rival interests by 
representatives who have both the means and the 
motives to check each other, and the federal 
principle structures the popular vote in such a 
way as to supply a goodly part of the motives. 
The federal principle balances the national and 
local interests, gives us a moderate, inclusive, 
political definition of national interest, and 
supports the separation of powers, thereby 
prevents majority tyranny. (Best, 1975, p. 41)
An example of compromise between majority and
minority parties appeared in a recent periodical entitled:
Senate Votes to Ban Drilling in National 
Monuments. The Democrat-led Senate voted
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Wednesday to bar coal mining, and oil and gas 
drilling inside federally protected National 
Monuments in the West, dealing a fresh blow to 
President Bush's energy production plans. The 
57-48 roll call aligned the Senate with the 
House which voted last month to ban mineral 
extraction from the Monuments after Democrats 
(minority) there won support from moderate 
Republicans (majority), (The Desert Sun, 2001)
Madison details the real character of the new
government by outlining the foundation on which it was to 
be established, the sources, extents and operation of its 
powers, and the authority by which future changes in the
government may be made. First, the Constitution is to be
ratified by the people, but not as individuals, but by 
states to which they belong, thus establishing that the
Constitution will not be a national, but a federal act.
Ratification is to result, not from a majority of the 
people, nor from a majority of the states, but must result 
from the unanimous agreement of the several states. Each 
state is considered a sovereign body, independent from all 
others. The new constitution will then be a federal, not a 
national constitution. The government appears to be of 
mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as
national features. He concludes:
The proposed Constitution, therefore, when 
tested by the rules laid down by its 
antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a
; national nor a federal constitution, but a
composition of both. In its foundation it is
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federal, not national; in the sources from which 
the ordinary powers of government are drawn, it 
is partly federal, and partly national; in the 
operation of these powers, it is national, not 
federal; in the extent of them, again, it is 
federal, not national; and finally, in its 
authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it 
is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. 
(Publius, 1961, p. 214)
35
CHAPTER FOUR
IS THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
UNDEMOCRATIC?
Critics of the Electoral College emerge from two 
distinct camps. First, those who condemn tangible elements 
of the system, as faithless electors, the contingency
election, or the unit-vote principle. Such denunciations 
are based on actual events and happenings with real causes 
and effects. These can and should be addressed by a 
citizenry that has experienced many changes since the
ratification of the Constitution in 1788. Second, there
are those who assault the intangibles, the principles, 
indulging in such name-calling as undemocratic, ambiguous, 
archaic, even dangerous. Subjective opinions are more 
difficult to analyze and assess as one attempts to 
separate bias and prejudice from logical thinking.
Martin Diamond has attempted to do just this, 
providing answers to The American Bar Association's
charges that the Electoral College is archaic,
undemocratic, complex, indirect and dangerous. Whatever is 
old is not necessarily archaic. Not only is the Electoral 
College not archaic, it is the very model of up-to-date
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flexibility. Since its ratification, the Electoral College
has shown great adaptability.
Electors have become nullities; presidential 
elections have become dramatic national 
contests; the federal elements in the process 
have been strengthened by the general-ticket 
practice; modern mass political parties have 
developed; campaigning moved from rather rigid 
sectionalism to the complexities of a modern 
technological society - all occurring tranquilly 
and legitimately within the original 
constitutional framework, as modified by the 
Twelfth Amendment. (Diamond, 1977, p. 46)
It is remarkable that, while it now operates in 
transformed ways, it still operates as the founding 
fathers intended. From the very beginning, the Electoral 
College was intended to operate democratically.
Independent electors as a substitute for direct popular 
election were chosen as a nationalizing substitute for the 
state legislatures. Confederalists had fought to have the 
president selected by state legislatures. Madison, James 
Wilson and Gouvernor Morris devised the Electoral College 
system to fend off the confederalizing threat. Thus, it 
was not an undemocratic, but an anti-states-rights 
stratagem to give the election to the people instead of to
the politicians.
Given the poor communications of the country at that 
time, it was feared that the people could not have the 
information necessary to make an intelligent choice of
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available candidates. Another fear was that ordinary 
voters, lacking broad knowledge of candidates, would vote 
for favorite sons, making large-state candidates the
winners.
Substituting electors precluded the difficulty of the 
wide discrepancies in suffrage laws in the states. The 
right of suffrage was much more dispersed in the North
than the South, where the slaves were not counted as
"persons". Again, the intention of the founding fathers 
was to find the most practical means for the selection of 
the president, not to subvert democracy.
The essential spirit of the Electoral College, as
that of the Constitution, was democratic from the start.
The Electoral College is not an archaic institution; 
because of its adaptability to change, it remains the most 
valuable means for selecting the chief executive.
Reformers who abhor the federal aspect of the
Electoral College fail to see that democracy is not the 
question; the choice is whether to select the president in 
a partly federally democratic, or a wholly nationally 
democratic way.
The discrepancy between the electoral and popular
votes exists in all districted forms of election. Because
populations are not evenly distributed in numbers or
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political sentiments, then it is possible that a winner of 
a majority of the districts may not always be the winner 
of the popular vote. When considering the advantages to be 
gained by the present system, the chance of a "wrong 
winner" is'worth taking. First, there is democratic 
responsiveness to local interests, needs, and sentiments. 
The American idea of democracy includes responsiveness to
local majorities. A nation of a multiplicity of interests,
ethnic groups, religions and races must be responsive to 
minorities. Americans cherish the guarantee that the 
districting principle provides; they accept the risk of a
national popular-vote district-vote discrepancy because
the advantages are many, and because the House and Senate
are nationally democratic enough to sustain a reasonable 
standard of democracy (Diamond, 1977). Elections in the
United States House of Representatives, as in the
California Assembly and Senate, are districted elections.
The fundamental premise of American democracy is that 
democracy, as in all other forms of government, cannot be 
a completely ideal system. The political system must be 
democratic enough, and then modified to include other 
vital considerations important to all its citizens.
The undemocratic threat of the Electoral College 
posed by its detractors, then, is that the possibility of
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50 percent minus one would win over 50 percent plus one. 
The direct vote plan contains the provision that 40
percent of the votes would be enough to declare a winner.
Which, then, is the more democratic?
Democracy is not at stake in our elections, only 
the decision as to which of the shifting portion 
of an overall democratic electorate will 
temporarily capture executive office. What 
serious difference does it make to any
fundamental democratic value if, in such 
elections, 50 percent minus one of the voters 
might-very infrequently-win the presidency from 
50 percent plus one of the voters. (Diamond, 
1977, p. 57)
To revise the Constitution for such a reason would
deplete democracy of all socioeconomic significance.
In answer to the charge of complexity, it should be
pointed out that complexity characterizes the entire 
political system. The bicameral nature of Congress is 
complex, federalism is complex, judicial review is 
complex, executive veto is complex, and the Bill of Rights 
contains numerous complexities. Are these to be condemned 
also? The American idea of government is not as concerned 
with a majoritarian democracy as it is with a system, 
which, while being democratic enough, albeit complex, 
still fulfills other worthwhile purposes.
The Electoral College has delivered exceptionally 
clear and unambiguous electoral decisions. No electoral
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system can be totally free of ambiguities, especially in 
closely'divided elections, but the present system, when a 
realistic, rather than an ideal standard is applied, must 
be rated as highly successful. Compared to the direct 
plan, it appears to be less ambiguous. The direct plan, 
with its single electoral district, provides for a runoff 
election, if the candidate receives less than 40 percent 
of the total vote. The problem of error and fraud could
very well be enhanced under this system; every precinct
would come under minute scrutiny, as candidates fought for 
winning votes. Under the Electoral College system,
challenges are infrequent, and limited in scope. The 
outcomes of elections are always accepted by the losing 
candidate and by all the American people as legitimate.
Dangers in the Electoral College system, cited by 
reformists are faithless electors, or the contingency 
election in the House of Representatives, but the main 
fear is the popular-vote, electoral-vote discrepancy. This 
has been alluded to as a loaded pistol pointed at our 
heads. However, in 1888, when it did go off, the country 
didn't turn a hair; the country was rewarded with a 
strong, stable, tranquil, legitimate government. And in 
the 2000 election, the day after the inaugural of George 
W. Bush, who lost the popular vote to Al Gore by a small
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percentage, the administration began the task of 
governance, the citizenry returned to its business of 
earning a living, and once again the federal democratic
form of presidential election was safe and secure, at 
least for an another four years.
The democratic foundations of the political system 
are not endangered by the remote possibility of a 
popular-vote electoral-vote discrepancy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE SURVIVAL
Since the Convention of 1787, none of the hundreds of
reform efforts to abolish the Electoral College system has
succeeded. Whether this is due to the benevolent wisdom of
government dignitaries, or to political expediency is a 
moot question; nevertheless, the federal
democratic-republic, including the method of selecting the
chief executive has survived. The district plan, the 
proportional plan, the direct plan, plus a myriad of
hybrid plans have all been found wanting in one element or 
another; today, the direct popular vote system is the only 
plan still promoted. "None completely preserves the basic 
elements of federalism and the constitutional compact; and 
none would preserve the two-party system, discourage 
factionalism, and still produce, at the possible risk of a 
constitutional crisis, a clear result in a presidential 
election" (Hardaway, 1994, p. 163). Yes, it is possible 
that a minority candidate may win an election. However, 
before the 2000 election, there had been only three
elections, (1824, 1876, 1888), where the winner lacked
both the greatest number of popular votes, as well as a
majority of popular votes. One of these, that of 1876, is
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doubtful because of fraud. There have been only two 
elections,.in 1800 and 1824, decided in a contingency
election in the House of Representatives. The likelihood 
of winning the popular, but not the electoral vote prompts 
candidates to seek the support of broad, nation-wide
groups (Best, 1996).
The faithless elector still has protection under the
Constitution; he has freedom of choice in the election
process, yet is constrained by popular opinion and party 
loyalty. Faithless electors have never yet stolen an
election or defeated the will of the people. Out of 16,000 
votes cast, only eight have ever voted against the 
candidates to whom they were pledged; not one has had any
effect whatsoever on the outcome of an election.
Twenty-four states bind their electors, and five states 
assess penalties for breaking pledges. As long as states 
have undisputed power for choosing electors, and stay 
within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment, they may 
exercise the right to refuse any unpledged elector (Best,
1996) .
In 1958, a period of upheaval and confrontation in 
American life, Walter Lippman wrote that, "the country has 
entered a period of revolutionary change of which no one 
can foresee the course or the end or the consequences"
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Bickel, 1971, p. 90). He was discussing the obsolescence 
of the two-party system. Bickel has a more positive 
attitude toward the revolutionary factions which were 
quite vociferous at that time. "The work of politics in 
the United States, and the work of politics even for those 
who set radical goals, is most effectively and enduringly 
done within the regime, not in opposition to it as such; 
within the system whose improvement I advocate, but which 
I praise" (Bickel, 1971, p. 90, 91). In the years 
following the radical sixties, the Electoral College 
remains alive and well; elections are decided in a timely,
consistent manner without the occurrence of revolutions.
We are well served by an attachment to 
institutions that are the products more of 
accident than design, or that no longer answer 
to their original purposes and plans, but that 
offer us comfort of continuity, and challenge 
our resilience1and inventiveness in bending old 
arrangements to present purposes with no outward 
change....We have, of course, many institutions 
which no longer,conform to the -original scheme, 
and we have bent most of them quite effectively 
to purposes of our present society....The fact 
that we have used them without modifying their 
structures has lent stability to our society and 
has built strength and confidence in our people. 
(Bickel, 1958, p. 3)
The Electoral College has been charged as no longer 
performing according to the intentions of the framers. The 
procedures in place today, built on the system outlined in 
the Constitution are a product of tradition and trial and
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error over the last two centuries. The courts, state
legislatures, Congress, and the major political parties 
have all been instrumental in adjusting the electoral 
system to the changing times and moods of today's 
citizens, but within the system, not in procedures yet
untried. In spite of changes, the federal nature of the
Constitution as
Madison expressed it succinctly in 1787 still
resounds forcefully today:
Cool and candid people will at once reflect that 
the purest of human blessings must have a 
portion of alloy in them; that the choice must 
always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at 
least of the greater, not the perfect, good; and 
that in every political institution, a power to 
advance the public happiness involves a 
discretion which may be misapplied and abused. 
They will see, therefore, that in all cases 
where power is to be conferred, the point first 
to be decided is whether such power be necessary 
to the public good; as the next will be, in case 
of an affirmative decision, to guard as 
effectually as possible against a perversion of 
the power to the public detriment. (Publius, 
1961, p. 213, 214)
Madison realized that the Electoral College system 
for electing the president was not perfect, but the issue 
is comparative merit, not absolute merit. Compared to the 
other selection processes offered to date, the present 
method seems to contain less imperfections.
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Conclusion Mending the Flaws
Although it is preferable to the many reform 
propositions offered, the Electoral College system is not
without flaw. There are six areas which need to be
addressed. First, and most often cited, is the faithless
elector, which could be remedied by an automatic plan, 
that eliminates the office of elector by automatically 
awarding electoral votes to the candidates receiving a 
plurality of votes within a state. Additionally, a less 
intrusive method to manage the faithless elector problem 
would be by an amendment which would give Congress the 
right to change the faithless elector's vote to the 
candidate to which the elector was pledged.
Secondly, the Constitution should be amended to 
require each state to adopt the general-ticket ballot. The 
general-ticket, winner-take-all procedure has provided the 
Electoral College with a means for maintaining and 
nurturing the two-party system, discouraging factionalism, 
and producing a clear and timely winner for over two 
centuries, and should be made mandatory for all the 
states. This would eliminate the potential danger of 
states manipulating the electoral system for political 
ends ]
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Third, the contingent election in the House of 
Representatives should be retained (this is not in 
agreement with some reformers), but should be more 
specifically interpreted. Should the incumbent House of 
Representatives or the incoming House elect the president?
There should be a clear-cut decision between the two, not
leaving it to chance. Also, there should be a
clarification with each state delegation as to whether the 
winning votes should be by majority or plurality. The 
present choice of three should be changed to the two top 
candidates, reducing the possibility that the vice 
president chosen in the Senate would be of the opposition
party.
The quorum requirements in both Senate and House 
contingency elections should be reduced. With no quorum 
requirement, most, if not all members of Congress would 
choose to attend the contingency election of the 
president. There should be a specific date for the 
election, both in the Senate and in the House, holding the 
House election first. All votes should be open, rather 
than by secret ballot. These changes would reduce the 
inducement for political mischief or fraud.
Fourth, all American citizens should be enabled to 
cast their votes for electors. At present, only the fifty
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states and the District of Columbia may appoint electors. 
The District of Columbia could be designated as storehouse
for the votes of all citizens not now citizens of a state,
and the District of Columbia should count all these votes
according to Constitutional rules.
Fifth, although states have adopted the popular
election method for choosing electors, it should not be
left to the choice of states. The Constitution should be
amended to provide that electors be chosen by popular
election in each state.
Sixth, in the certification of electoral votes, each 
state should be required to provide a method for settling
controversies over electoral votes within the state. A
decision should be made between the incumbent governor, or 
governor-elect as to whom should certify electoral votes. 
"The electoral votes as certified by the government should 
be absolutely final; Congress should not to second-guess 
the governor of a State" (Hardaway, 1994, p. 167).
Best recommends the automatic plan of selecting the 
president by eliminating altogether the Electoral College, 
but retaining the electoral votes. In addition to solving
I
the ^problem of the faithless elector, the automatic plan 
would be instrumental in clarifying problems that might 
arise because of the death or resignation of a
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presidential candidate. If a candidate dies, or resigns 
after the general election in November, and the meeting on 
the first Monday following the second Wednesday in 
December, there is no provision for this contingency. If a 
Constitutional amendment abolishing the office of elector,
and the electoral votes were awarded automatically, this 
defect would be eradicated, and the vice president-elect 
would succeed to the office automatically (Best, 1975).
These changes could be made without altering the
basic federalist composition of the electoral process, or
reducing its advantages. They would eliminate the
possibility of conflict and uncertainty in the event of 
unusual or unanticipated occurrences in the election
process.
Glennon suggests that the objective, or value sought
should determine the means of selection of the chief
executive. He believes that the principle objective should 
be enhanced legitimacy, together with the reinforcement of 
the values of federalism (Glennon, 1922). The objectives 
decided upon, then, should be determined by their effects 
upon a particular system. If all essentials, such as 
Glennon discusses are seriously considered, then it is 
wise to err on the side of caution, to retain a system
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that has been tried and found to be exemplary in its
comportment.
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